Separated by Civilization: Trans-Atlantic Impasse
大西洋到底有多宽? 8211;论欧、美文明的同宗与异见
By Peter Schneider -秋叶 评注
The war in Iraq has made the Atlantic seem wider. But really it has had the effect of a magnifying glass, bringing older and more fundamental differences between Europe and the United States into focus.2
These growing divisions ?over war, peace, religion, sex, life and death ?amount to a philosophical dispute about the common origins of European and American civilization. Both children of the Enlightenment, the United States and Europe clearly differ about the nature of this inheritance and about who is its better custodian.3
Start with religion. The United States is experiencing a revival of the Christian faith in many areas of civic and political life, while in Europe the process of secularization continues unabated.4 Today the United States is the most religious-minded society of the Western democracies. In a 2003 Harris poll5 79 percent of Americans said they believed in God, and more than a third said they attended a religious service once a month or more. Numerous polls have shown that these figures are much lower in Western Europe. In the United States a majority of respondents in recent years told pollsters that they believed in angels, while in Europe the issue was apparently considered so preposterous6 that no one even asked the question.
Terms that President George W. Bush has used, like 8220;crusade 8221; and 8220;axis of evil, 8221; and Manichaean exclusions like his observation that anyone who is not on our side is on the side of the terrorists, reveal the assumption of a religious mantle by a secular power, which in Europe has become unthinkable.7 Was it not, perhaps, this same sense of religious infallibility that seduced senior members of the Bush administration into leading their country into a war with Iraq on the basis of information that has turned out to be false?8
Another reason for Europe 8217;s alienation from the United States is harder to define, but for want of a better term, I call it American narcissism9.
When American troops in Iraq mistakenly shoot an Arab journalist or reduce half of a village to rubble in response to the explosion of a roadside bomb, there will inevitably be a backlash10. Only a fool would maintain that an occupying power could afford many such mistakes, even if it is under constant threat of suicide attacks. The success of an occupation policy — however temporary it is meant to be — depends on the occupier 8217;s ability to convince the population, by means of symbolic and material gestures, that it is prepared to admit to mistakes.
In its use of the language of power the Bush administration has created the opposite impression, and not just in Iraq. The United States apparently cannot be wrong about anything, nor does it have to apologize to anybody. In many parts of the world people have come to believe, fairly or not, that Americans regard the life of their countrymen as infinitely more valuable than the lives of any other of the earth 8217;s inhabitants.
Of course, even in Europe only a pacifist minority denies the existence of necessary, unavoidable, justified wars.11 The interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan12 were supported by many European nations, even if some took a long time to make up their minds. European soldiers took part in those wars and continue to play a part in the peacekeeping aftermath13.
What arouses European suspicion, though, is the doctrine of just, preemptive wars Bush has outlined. Anyone who claims to be waging a preventive war in the cause of justice is confusing either a particular or a partisan interest with the interests of humanity. A president who makes such a claim would be arrogating the right to be the ultimate arbiter of war and peace and to stand in judgment over the world.14 From there it is but a short step to dismissing a basic insight of the Enlightenment, namely that human judgment and decisions are fallible by their very nature. This fallibility cannot be annulled or ameliorated by any political, legal or religious authority. The same argument goes for the death penalty.15
Animosity16 isn 8217;t the only feature of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Europe is rightly envious of America 8217;s multicultural society. There can be no doubt that the United States has produced the World 8217;s most varied and integrative culture, and it is no accident that it is the only one to have a worldwide appeal.
But the American multicultural model also generates an illusion. Since Americans really have come from all over the world, in the United States it is easy to believe that you can know and understand the world without ever leaving the country. Those who were born and brought up in America forget that these people 8220;from all over the world 8221; first had to become Americans ?a condition that new immigrants generally accept with enthusiasm ?before they could celebrate their cultural otherness.17
The impressive integrative power of American society seems to generate a kind of obliviousness to the world, a multicultural unilateralism.18 The result is a paradox: a fantastically tolerant and flexible society that has absorbed the whole world, yet has difficulty comprehending the world beyond its borders.
These differences and irritations add up to a substantial disagreement on the joint origins of American and European civilization. Europeans think that Americans are on their way to betraying some of the elementary tenets of the Enlightenment, establishing a new principle in which they are 8220;first among unequals. 8221;19
And Washington accuses Europe of shirking its international responsibilities, and thus its own human rights inheritance.
Unfortunately, we cannot expect the news media in the United States or Europe to present a nuanced20 views of this dispute. In 20 years of traveling back and forth between Germany and America I have become convinced that news broadcasts usually confirm their audiences 8217; views: in Europe, about America, the 8220;cowboy nation, 8221; and in the United States, about Europe, the 8220;axis of weasels21. 8221;
These disagreements will be influenced but cannot be resolved by the American presidential election in November. The divisions are too deep, and Europe cannot meet the United States halfway on too many issues ?the separation between church and state, the separation of powers, respect for international law, the abolition of the death penalty —without surrendering its version of its Enlightenment inheritance22.
On other contentious issues the United States feels as strongly: the universality of human rights and the need to intervene — if the United Nations is unable to act — when there is genocide or ethnic cleansing, or when states are failing.23
So are we standing on the threshold of a new understanding or a new historic divide, comparable to the evolutionary split that occurred when a group of pioneer hominids thousands of years ago turned their backs forever on their African homeland?24
So far it has usually been the Americans who have had to remind the Europeans of these common origins, which the Europeans, in turn, have so often betrayed. Maybe this time it is up to the Europeans to remind the Americans of the promises of the Enlightenment that the Unite States seems to have forgotten.- 1. impasse: 僵局。
2. 但实际上这场战争具有放大镜的效果，让欧洲和美国之间由来已久的、更为根本的区别凸显出来。
3. 美国和欧洲均为启蒙运动的后代，但它们对这份遗产的性质以及谁才是其最佳继承人的看法显然不同。child: 后代/深受某种影响的人;the Enlightenment: 启蒙运动，指18世纪欧洲以推崇“理性”、怀疑教会权威和封建制度为特点的文化思想运动;custodian：原意是“保管人”，这里指遗产的继承人。
4. secularization: 世俗化;unabated: 不减弱的，不衰退的。
5. Harris Poll：哈里斯民意测验，在美国很有权威性。
6. preposterous: 荒谬的，愚蠢的。
7. 布什总统使用着“十字军东征”、“邪恶轴心”之类的词儿，奉行不在我们这边，就在恐怖主义那边的排他主义，这都反映了一个世俗政权继承了宗教衣钵的架势，而这种架势在欧洲是不可思议的。manichaean/;m*n!